Japan's case in the Sino-Japanese dispute : as presented before the Assembly of the League of Nations, at the final meeting on the subject

APR - 7 1933

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JAPAN’S CASE

IN THE SINO-JAPANESE DISPUTE

AS PRESENTED BEFORE THE
ASSEMBLY OF THE LEAGUE
OF NATIONS, AT THE FINAL
MEETING ON THE SUBJECT

BY HIS EXCELLENCY

YOSUKE MATSUOKA

Japanese Chamber of Commerce
OF New York, inc.

19 3 3

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2018 with funding from
Columbia University Libraries

https://archive.org/details/japanscaseinsinoOOmats

CONTENTS

I.

Address of His Excellency Yosuke Matsuo ka,
Chief Japanese Delegate, before the Assembly of the
League of Nations, Prior to the Voting on
the Report of the Committee of
Nineteen, February 24, 1933.

II.

Mr. Matsuoka’s Final Address, after the Voting.

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Address delivered by Yosuke Matsuoka, Chief Japanese
Delegate, at the Seventeenth Plenary Meeting of the
Special Assembly of the League of Nations.
FEBRUARY 24, 1933.

I.

Mr. President and Gentlemen: — I do not feel called
upon to reply to the discourse of my distinguished Chi¬
nese colleague, for most of the points brought up by him,
were made very clear in the Observations of my Govern¬
ment and subsequent speeches of mine ; some of them you
will find replied to as I proceed with my speech.

The Japanese Delegation have notified the Assembly
that they disagree with the Draft Report prepared by the
Committee of Nineteen and cannot accept it. It is hardly
necessary for me to say that the Japanese Government
have given careful and serious consideration to this docu¬
ment and that it is with sad disappointment that they
have come to this conclusion.

One outstanding feature that is noticeable throughout
the Draft Report is the failure on the part of the Com¬
mittee of Nineteen to realise the actual situation in the
Far East, the difficulties of Japan’s position in the midst
of an unparalleled and appalling circumstance, and the
ultimate aim that is impelling Japan in her action.

For over twenty years China has been going through
a revolution which has brought disaster to her people.
Tens of millions of people have lost their lives as a result
of internecine warfare, tyranny, banditry, famine and
flood; hundreds of millions of them have been plunged
into misery and despair. With armies of communists
ranging over a wider territory than the Nanking Gov¬
ernment controls, a condition of chaos reigns throughout
the country. Such distresses and miseries as exist among
the Chinese people are beyond the imagination of the

[6]

average man or woman living in Western countries. And
the end of this catastrophe is not in sight. No one can
foresee how long it will continue.

The fundamental cause of the trouble in the Far East
is the lawless condition in China, the impossible reign of
self-will in that country, without recognition on her part
of her obligations to her neighbours. China has long
been derelict in her international duties as a sovereign
State and Japan as her nearest neighbour has been the
greatest sufferer on that score.

Since the beginning of the revolution, which has shat¬
tered China into parts, all of what were called under the
Manchu Dynasty the dependencies of the Empire have
been lost to the Republic. Over none of these former de¬
pendencies has China any longer any control. Tibet is
independent; Chinese Turkestan is completely cut off
from contact with China proper; Outer Mongolia became
many years ago a part of the Soviet Union. Only Man¬
churia has remained, down to last year, a part of China
— a part by a measure of contact and association, under
the nominal sovereignty of that country. To say that
Manchuria was under full sovereignty of China would be
a distortion of the actual and historic facts. Now this
territory has gone, it has become an independent State.

China is a vast country; but it is not a nation or
country in the sense that Western peoples use the term.
It is a country, larger than Europe, a region with as
many governments in it as there are governments in
Europe, a region with almost as many different groups
of people, speaking almost as many mutually unin¬
telligible dialects. That is one reason why China, in
spite of her size, in spite of the enormous number of
men in the various armies of the many dictators, is un¬
able to defend itself today, unable to rid itself, as it
desires, of the foreign military forces stationed in and
about its Treaty Ports, and the foreign naval vessels
that ply the Yangtze River. These forces as I have said
before, are not only Japanese. They are British, Ameri-

[6]

can, French, Italian and others. They guard the lives of
the diplomats accredited to the Central Government,
the so-called Central Government. Less than five years
ago a portion of these forces, British and American, had
to go into action at Nanking, the capital of the country,
to save the lives of their official representatives assaulted
by Government troops. For the moment, however, — this
present moment — the hostility to other foreigners is
abated, as you all must have noticed. It is being
officially restrained with a definite object in view. We
are not now hearing of China’s determination to undo
the “unequal treaties.” Why not? Why has this agi¬
tation, vigorously and officially conducted prior to Sep¬
tember, 1931, come abruptly to an end? Have you
thought about that point? The answer is obvious. I
need not make it.

China is a backward country, a country in an appal¬
ling condition of disintegration and distress. China is a
problem, as the Lytton Commission has reported, to the
peace of the world.

Beside China and beside another vast country, — I
speak of Soviet Russia, — is Japan, a comparatively small
country, very different from either of its colossal neigh¬
bours. The conditions of these neighbours in the past
twenty years have given us Japanese deep and anxious
concern. Our anxiety is not ended. We look into the
gloom of the future and can see no certain gleam of
light before us.

Inexorably situated beside China in chaos, Japan has
had to bear and forbear, and for many years tried pa¬
tiently to have her many grievances with the Chinese
settled in an amicable manner. She followed that policy
of conciliation even in the face of violent criticism from
a portion of her own people. It has been Japan’s hope
and determination that Manchuria should become a land
of law and order, of peace and abundance, a land that
would be of benefit not only to Eastern Asia but to the
world at large. To achieve that end Japan was long

[7]

prepared to co-operate with China, and she sought this
co-operation, sought it for years. The Chinese, however,
would not accept our proferred friendship and assistance.
Instead, they offered constant obstructions and created
continuous difficulties. In recent years — and especially
since the deliberate development of antiforeign senti¬
ment by the Kuomintang and by the Nationalist Gov¬
ernment — this opposition was intensified. The more we
displayed patience, the more intense became the oppo¬
sition until at last it reached a point that was intoler¬
able. Instead of meeting us halfway, China took this
attitude of ours as a sign of weakness. The Chinese
began to claim that the Japanese should be driven out
of Manchuria, that Japan should no longer share in the
development of that land, condemning Japan as an ag¬
gressor pure and simple, as though there was no reason
whatever for her to be in Manchuria, ignoring the whole
historic background. This is not the first time that
China has accused us of aggression. The impossible
attitude and the violent movement based on such psy¬
chology on the part of the Chinese lay really at the bot¬
tom of the trouble, that finally resulted in what hap¬
pened. Japan’s policy of patience and conciliation failed.
It failed because of China’s, or rather Chang Hsueh-
Liang’s, inability to appreciate Japan’s intentions and
friendliness.

It should not be necessary for me to dwell upon the
importance that Japan attaches to Manchuria. The As¬
sembly of the League should know by this time the eco¬
nomic and political necessities of Japan in that terri¬
tory. But at this critical moment I want to remind you
again that Japan fought two wars in Manchuria, in one
of which she staked her existence as a nation on the
outcome. She wants to fight no other.

It is true that international peace can be secured only
upon the basis of mutual concessions. There are, how¬
ever, with every nation, certain questions so vital to its
existence that no concession or compromise is possible.

[8]

The Manchurian problem is one of them. It constitutes
such a problem to the nation of Japan. It is regarded
by our people as a question of life and death.

The Powers of the world have long been dealing in
fictions regarding China. Long ago we should have
noticed that the first Article of the Covenant requires
that a State, Dominion or Colony, to be a member of
the League shall be “fully self-governing.” China is no
such state. Beyond China Proper the sovereignty of
China has long been gone, while within China Proper
there has been no constituted government supreme and
able to govern. The Nanking Government administers
today the affairs of less than four out of the Eighteen
Provinces.

The world cannot deal in such fictions as these and
call upon the League to uphold the letter of treaties.

It is the firm conviction of the Japanese Government
that Japan has been and will always be the mainstay of
peace, order and progress in the Far East. If she has
taken a definite stand regarding Manchuria in recent
months, it is because she has been actuated by the im¬
plicit faith that that was the only course left to her
after years of unrewarded forbearance and waiting. If
she insists upon the maintenance of the independence of
Manchoukuo, she is guided by the confident belief that
in the present circumstances that independence offers
the only guarantee of peace and order in the Far East.

Even after the present Sino-Japanese dispute began,
Japan continued in her policy of conciliation. If China
had been capable in those days of realising the actuali¬
ties of the situation and had agreed to negotiations with
Japan in a sincere desire to arrive at an agreement, one
could have been accomplished without great difficulty.
But China did not take that course. And what did she
do? Instead, she appealed to the League of Nations.
She sought to bind Japan’s hands through the interven¬
tion of the Powers composing the League. And the
League, not fully understanding the real issues involved

[9]

or the actual conditions existing in the Far East, and
perhaps not suspecting the real motive for the Chinese
move, gave her encouragement. Here lies the trouble.

It cannot be doubted that the League of Nations, in
dealing with the Sino- Japanese dispute, endeavoured sin¬
cerely and conscientiously to bring about a satisfactory
settlement at an early date. But, in point of fact, its
actions have continually resulted in giving China a false
hope and in encouraging her to take an attitude of de¬
fiance against Japan. In making her appeal to the
League China was not, as you have been told, acting
from her love of peace and her loyalty to principles. A
country with more armed men than any other is not a
nation of pacifists. A country which has habitually
broken international pledges is not a nation that respects
principles.

In proposing to the League to send a Commission of
Enquiry to China, Japan was actuated by the belief that
it was urgent and essential that the League should fully
understand the realities of conditions existing there.
But the result was disappointing to Japan. The Report
of the Commission proved to be, in some respects, super¬
ficial in character. It displayed, in parts, a lack of
penetration. It often failed to probe the problem to its
depths. One of the reasons for this was undoubtedly
the brief time in which the Commission had to make its
investigations.

In this connection let me say a word regarding the
population of Manchoukuo. A false impression has been
given to the world by the Lytton Report on this subject.
There were no authentic statistics upon which the
Commission could base its view. No reliable Chinese
census has ever been taken, even in China proper, and
any figures placed before the Commission by Chinese
authorities could not be regarded as dependable. For
many years the racial term “Chinese” has been applied,
particularly by foreigners, including Japanese, to most
of the people of the Chinese Empire. But this laxity

[lOJ

in expression should not be taken to mean that Manchus
and Mongols, or even the people of China proper, are
all of a single racial stock. The majority of the people
of Manchoukuo are distinctly different from those of
China. Even the people of North China, from the
Provinces of Shantung and Hopei, who have migrated
to Manchuria to the extent of several millions in recent
years, are strikingly different from those of other Chi¬
nese Provinces, different from those of the Yangtze
Valley, more different from those of South China, radi¬
cally different from those of Western China — different in
physical appearance, different in many of their customs
and in some cases even in their language. But even
these immigrants who have gone from China to Man¬
churia in recent years do not form the bulk of the
population. They form probably but a tenth, or at most
but a fifth, of it. The great body of the population can
properly be described as Manchurian. It is formed by
the descendants of the old Manchu stock, by old Chi¬
nese stock which affiliated itself with the Manchus in
former years, and by Mongols. The great majority of
these people have never lived in China and have no such
attachment to that country as the Lytton Report de¬
scribes. Here the Report was clearly in error.

Regarding the Report of the Committee of Nineteen,
I am constrained to make a critical remark. I do not
want to accuse that Committee of prejudice, but I can¬
not refrain from making the observation that, while
China is exonerated, nothing whatever is said of the
work of my country and people in their long and difficult
efforts to preserve peace, to promote law and order, to
benefit the people of Manchuria.

The good work of my country in Manchuria is on
record. It is not on record however, in the draft Report,
but you can see it in Manchuria. The physical develop¬
ments that we have made there are visible monuments
of our efforts and our ability. The well-ordered cities
of the Leased Territory, the thriving condition of the

[11]

Railway Zone, the improvement of Chinese cities in¬
fluenced by our initiative, the vast mining and industrial
enterprises, the schools, the hospitals, the technical
bureaux, — these things, the likes of which exist nowhere
under Chinese administration, are testimony to our ser¬
vice to the people of the land. In short, we have been
and are a great civilizing and stabilizing force in that
wild country. If the Committee of Nineteen knew and
understood what we have done to benefit the people of
Manchuria they might have gone out of their way to
say just a word in favour of this great work of ours.
If they did not know and understand why the people of
China Proper migrate to Manchuria, it might have been
well for them to enquire. Yet they have felt that their
knowledge was sufficient to qualify them in proposing
to the Assembly that it adopt the momentous proposal
contained in this Draft Report. Do you really think it
is right? Do you think it is common-sense?

On the first page of the Report are these lines. I
quote them:

“The issues involved in this conflict are not as
simple as they are often represented to be. They
are, on the contrary, exceedingly complicated. And
only an intimate knowledge of all the facts, as ivell
as of their historical background, should entitle any¬
one to express a definite opinion upon them.”

This passage was, as you know, taken from the
Lytton Report, and the Commission was right in having
this passage in its Report. Beginning with this state¬
ment, the Committee of Nineteen proceeded to pass judg¬
ment in this dispute, judgment against a nation which
is the bulwark of whatever law, order, and peace there
exist in the Far East, and in favour of one whose back¬
ward condition has been the cause of w^ars in the Far
East for nearly a century. I suppose I may take it
that the members of this Assembly who are now about
to vote on the draft Report have all read histories of
China written by impartial authors. But I am not too

[12]

sure of that, for there seems to have been a lack of care¬
ful reading even of the Lytton Report.

Let us now turn to the recommendations made by
the Commission of Enquiry. Their full significance
seems to have been overlooked in the Draft Report be¬
fore us. I refer in particular to the tenth and final
Principle contained in Chapter IX. That Principle reads
as follows:

“Since the present political instability in China is
an obstacle to friendship with Japan and an anxiety
to the rest of the world (as the maintenance of peace
in the Far East is a matter of international concern),
and since the conditions enumerated above cannot be
fulfilled without a strong Central Government in
China, the final requisite for a satisfactory solution
is temporary international co-operation in the in¬
ternal reconstruction of China, as suggested by the
late Dr. Sun Yat-sen.”

I would ask the League to consider carefully this
definite warning. I would ask that it be not misled by
the thought or the hope that China can be changed by
the mere sending of technical commissions to aid the
harrassed government with advice regarding sanitation,
education, railway, financial and other administration.
More than that is needed, much more — so much that no
great Power or group of them would be willing to under^
take the task. Some form of international control may
be helpful, but who is going to undertake it? Of this
I am speaking earnestly, and I am speaking with knowl¬
edge of China — the real China, the China that exists in
fact and not in theory or imagination, the China that
has made many wars already, and now seeks to make
another, the China that does not fight her own battles,
but calls on distant friends to fight her near-by neigh¬
bour.

In the above connection, permit me to put one cate¬
gorical question to my Chinese colleagues. Although my
colleague Dr. Yen expressed — on behalf of the Govern-

[13]

merit that exists at Nanking, but which does not rule
the whole of China — his willingness to accept the recom¬
mendations without any reservation, I would put this
categorical question to him and his colleagues to answer:
Are the Chinese Government really prepared to accept
these recommendations which envisage in the final an¬
alysis the imposition on China of an international con¬
trol in one form or another? You cannot get away from
that, however you may try to cover it up with words.
Will you make the position of your Government clear
on this point before the Assembly votes on this present
Draft Report?

I have no doubt that the attitude of the League in
the present dispute has always been conceived with a
genuine desire to uphold the sanctity of treaties and the
principles of peace and serve the cause of peace, but its
efforts have had the result of adding confusion to the
situation. The Jehol affair, which is giving all of us
concern at this moment, is a case in point. It is a
demonstration on China’s part, made for the purpose of
affecting the League’s decisions. There would have
been no onrush of Chang Hsueh-liang’s troops beyond
the Great Wall except for instigation from the Nanking
Government which, in turn, has been encouraged by the
attitude the League of Nations has been taking vis-a-
vis Japan. The Japanese Government are not in the
least anxious about the outcome of a conflict with these
Chinese contingents. They are not the troops of a mod¬
ern army, well trained, well disciplined, well organised,
well officered. They are not troops inspired with zeal
for a cause or love of country. They are mercenary
troops, with loyalty only to their military chief, and,
like other Chinese armies, loyal because their chief pro¬
vides for them the means of living. The moment some
other chief tempts these soldiers with money or means
of living they will desert their present chief. But Japan
is loath to see further unnecessary bloodshed, and, for
that reason, has been and is endeavouring to persuade

[14]

Marshal Chang to withdraw his forces. The prospects,
however, do not seem at this moment very encouraging.

I refer to the situation in Jehol to bring home to you
the possible effect the adoption of the Report now before
us may have upon the situation in the Far East. Please
think seriously on this point. The adoption of this re¬
port would give the impression to the Chinese that they
had been exonerated from all responsibility, that they
could continue to defy Japan with impunity. It would
serve further to embitter the feelings of the Japanese
and Chinese peoples, whose interests are closely inter¬
woven. The two peoples ought to be friends and should
co-operate with each other for their common welfare.

By the adoption of the Report before you, however,
the Assembly would not be helping us, either Japanese
or Chinese, along the road to that goal, nor would it
serve the cause of peace or the interests of the suffer¬
ing masses in China. There are two Chinas: the China
of war lords, politicians, and of those gentlemen who
have been educated abroad and represent an imaginary
China at an Assembly like this, and the China of four
hundred fifty million souls suffering under the yoke of
these war lords and politicians, who care nothing about
their welfare. By the adoption of this Report, would
you be serving the cause of these suffering masses in
China?

The Report of the Committee of Nineteen not only
accepts the Report of the Commission of Enquiry but
goes even further: it passes judgment on the basis of
premises which are incongruous and far removed from
actualities.

Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria was only nominal
at most, but the Draft Report before us would under¬
take to establish Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria
in a more or less effective manner; that is to say, it
undertakes to introduce into Manchuria the power and
influence that China has never had before. Let us pause
and think; does it stand to reason? It would, moreover.

[15]

open the way for Chinese agitators and give rise to
more complications only to end, I am afraid, in another
and possibly worse catastrophe.

Again, the Draft Report makes an attempt to estab¬
lish a measure of international control over Manchuria,
where there has been and is no such control. A moment
ago I was referring to the international control of China,
but now I am referring to the setting up of international
control of Manchuria. What justification is there for
such an attempt on the part of the League of Nations?
I cannot see. Would the American people agree to such
control over the Panama Canal Zone? Would the British
people permit it over Egypt? In any case, how would
you do it? Which of your Governments would under¬
take it, assuming a grave and heavy responsibility cer¬
tain to entail sacrifices — sacrifices, I am sure, of great
magnitude ?

In this connection, let me state clearly once and for
all that the Japanese people will, for reasons too patent
for me to feel necessary to explain, oppose any such at¬
tempt in Manchuria. You can be sure of that. We do
not mean to defy the world at all; it is only our right.
This must be plain to anyone who would take pains to
read the history of the Far East.

A verdict is given in the Draft Report that the
Chinese boycott against Japanese goods imposed after
the outbreak of the present dispute falls within the pur¬
view of retaliatory measures. My distinguished Chinese
colleague referred in particular to this, and you, gentle¬
men, will in time know what is meant. If the adoption
by Powers of any forcible measures, made necessary by
the exigencies of the situation, for the protection of
their rights and interests and for the protection of the
rights and property of their nationals in China, is on
each occasion to be met lawfully by a retaliatory boy¬
cott, a very dangerous principle will have been estab¬
lished, and established by the League of Nations. The

[16]

seeds of incalculable future trouble for each and every
Power interested in China will have been sown.

You should think twice before you adopt a report
which includes such a principle as this.

If you are interested in the problem of peace in the
Far East, and I believe you are, you will find, as I had
occasion to point out previously, that the real question,
the greatest question before us today is the anarchy in
China. But you have not proposed to do anything in
that connection. The Manchurian question is only one
phase or rather an upshot of it. In the eagerness to
deal with the Manchurian question, you are forgetting
the big question that lies at the root of all the troubles
in the Far East — the anarchy in China. What are you
going to do about it?

In the actual circumstances in which Japan finds her¬
self as above described, and for the reasons above stated
at some length, there is no alternative for her to take
in regard to the draft report before us. The Committee
of Nineteen has left her none. She had promptly and
unequivocally to answer “No.”

Our desire is to help China as far as lies within our
power. We are sincere. This is a duty that we must
assume whether we like it or not. Paradoxical as this
statement may sound to you at this moment, it is true;
and our present effort to assist Manchoukuo to her feet,
over which we are unfortunately having differences, will
lead some day, I am confident, to the realisation of
Japan’s desire and duty to help China and thereby at
last to succeed in firmly establishing peace throughout
the region of Eastern Asia.

Gentlemen, will you give Japan a chance to realise
this aim or will you not?

I beg this body to realise the facts and see a vision
of the future. I earnestly beg you to deal with us on
our terms and give us your confidence. Our history dur¬
ing the past sixty years is, I think, a guarantee of our
good faith; is that history of no worth beside China’s

[17]

history, the history of creating disturbances and bring¬
ing about catastrophes in the Far East? To deny us
this appeal will be a mistake. I ask you not to adopt
this Report, — for the sake of peace in the Far East and
for the sake of peace throughout the world.

o-

11.

Declaration of the Japanese Government following the
vote of the Assembly on the Report and Recom¬
mendations submitted by the Committee
of Nineteen.

Mr. President and Gentlemen : — On behalf of my
Government I wish to make a declaration.

It is a source of profound regret and disappointment
to the Japanese Delegation and to the Japanese Govern¬
ment that the Draft Report has now been adopted by
this Assembly.

Japan has been a member of the League of Nations
since its inception. Our delegates to the Versailles Con¬
ference of 1919 took part in the drafting of the Cov¬
enant. We have been proud to be a Member, associated
with the leading nations of the world, in one of the
grandest purposes in which humanity could unite. It
has always been our sincere wish and pleasure to co¬
operate with the fellow-members of the League in at¬
taining the great aim held in common and long cherished
by humanity. I deeply deplore the situation we are now
confronting, for I do not doubt that the same aim, the
desire to see a lasting peace established, is animating
all of us in our deliberations and our actions.

[18]

It is a matter of common knowledge that Japan’s
policy is fundamentally inspired by a genuine desire to
guarantee peace in the Far East and to contribute to
the maintenance of peace throughout the world. Japan,
however, finds it impossible to accept the Report adopted
by the Assembly, and in particular, she has taken pains
to point out that the Recommendations contained therein
could not be considered such as would secure peace in
that part of the world.

The Japanese Government now find themselves com¬
pelled to conclude that Japan and the other Members of
the League entertain different views on the manner to
achieve peace in the Far East and the Japanese Gov¬
ernment are obliged to feel that they have now reached
the limit of their endeavours to co-operate with the
League of Nations in regard to the Sino-Japanese
differences.

The Japanese Government will, however, make their
utmost efforts for the establishment of peace in the Far
East and for the maintenance and strengthening of good
and cordial relations with other Powers. I need hardly
add that the Japanese Government persist in their de¬
sire to contribute to human welfare and will continue
their policy of co-operating in all sincerity in the work
dedicated to world peace, in so far as such co-operation
is possible in the circumstances created by the unfortu¬
nate adoption of the Report.

On behalf of the Japanese delegation, before leaving
the room, let me tender their sincerest appreciation of
the labours ungrudgingly given to find a solution of the
Sino-Japanese dispute before you, for the past seventeen
months, by the President and Members of the Council,
as well as by the President and Members of the General
Assembly.

[19]

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